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Chapter pages in book: (p. 28 - 32)ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF MONETARY EXPANSION
An expansion in the circulating medium may com.e about by a variety of
means. In addition to the problems raised by the increase in circulation itself,
therefore, there are further problems. relating to the advantages or dis-
advantages of the methods used to produce the expansion. In the case of some
of these possible methods the issue is: sufficiently current, or recurrent, to
warrant further examination. It may be remarked at the outset that the fol-
lowing analysis of the characteristics of different methods of financing, all of
which are expansionist, does not imply an endorsement of any one of them.
Borrowing from Banks vs. tile Issue of backs"
At times like the present, proposals invariably appear for reducing the costs
of war by dispensing with the payment of interest. In its more sophisticated
form the argument runs along the following lines: if it is possible to borrow
from banks at interes.t and let them manufacture non-interest-bearing debt in
the form of demand deposits which serve as circulating medium, why should
not the government manufacture circulating non-interest-bearing debt—such
as greenbacks—directly, thus saving the cost of the interest charge? In view
of the persistence of the question, it is worth examining a few of the possible
consequences should the government issue a large quantity of greenbacks
instead of borrowing a similar amount from banks.
In thç case of Treasury borrowing from banks, demand deposits are cus-
tomarily created and placed at the disposal of the government. If the govern-
ment were to issue greenbacks and place the newly printed currency to the
credit of its deposit accounts, the effect would likewise be to expand de-
posits but the banks would have added cash instead of bonds to their assets.
If, on the other hand, the government were to pay out the greenbacks
directly, the recipients of these payments might use the bulk of the proceeds
to expand their deposit balances with banks. This would be in keeping with
the custom of making the largest share of payments by check, a long.-
established preference which the issue of additional paper money would no
necessarily alter. Thus the final composition of the circulatin.g medium might
be much the same whether the initial expansion took the form of deposits
or currency.
It might, perhaps, be supposed that the greenbacks would remain in circu-
lation and would circulate at a greater speed than a similar volume of
demand depos.its. This is by no means. certain. In the first place, the green-
backs, as has been remarked, might chiefly enter into use not as currency
but as the source of additional deposits; .and in the second place, currency
ordinarily circulates more slowly than deposits.. Nor would the entire issue
28necessarily be a net addition: a part of the greenbacks might simply take
the place of the expansion of Federal Reserve notes that is occurring under
present methods of financing.
The issue of paper money, then, might serve to expand demand deposits
in much the same way as is now being done by direct Treasury borrowing
from banks. Why is it generally believed that the former would be so much
more inflationary than the latter? The reasons most commonly advanced
are that the issue of greenbacks would destroy public confidence and
contribute to further inflation by, for example, interfering with the sale of
war savings bonds, stimulating panic buying, and fostering political abuses
of all sorts. The exact inflationary of any printing of paper cannot be
told in advance, for the reason that mass behavior is highly unpredictable
at any given time.
A further reason for believing that the issue of paper money would be
more inflationary than the direct borrowing from the banks, while less
familiar than the other, rests on the difference in the effect of the two
methods of expansion upon the position of bank assets in general and bank
reserves in particular. If the issue of greenbacks served to expand deposits,
reserves would be increased by an approximately equal amount so that the
ratio of reserves to deposits would rise. In other words, excess reserves would
be greatly expanded. Borrowing from banks, by expanding deposits but not
reserves, has just the opposite tendency; excess reserves are decreased.
The potentialities present in, such a situation may be illustrated by
supposing that instead of borrowing $i8 billion from member banks in the
year following Pearl Harbor, the government had issued $i8 billion of
greenbacks. Let us assume that $4 billion of this took the place of the expan-
sion that occurred in Federal Reserve notes in circulation. If we assume,
in accordance with the reasoning suggested above, that all the remainder were
used to expand demand deposits, this would mean that member bank
reserves would have increased by $14billioninstead of by $758millionas
was actually the case. Under these circumstances the Reserve authorities
would have faced a problem not of having to create more credit, hut of hav-
ing to absorb a vastly increased supply of credit. In December 1942excess
reserves would have come to $14.6 billion. Such a huge volume of excess
reserves could be highly disruptive of conditions in the money market and
seriously inflationary in its possibilities.
Borrow-and-Buy vs. Direct Borrowing from Banks
A more pressing issue exists in connection with the way in which bank
credit is brought into play in the purchase of government securities. During
29the last war extensive use was made of private borrowing from banks as a
means of obtaining funds with which to subscribe to government bonds, the
bonds themselves serving as security for the loans.24 This resulted in the
creation of demand deposits payable to individuals and turned over by them
to the government. Present policies of war financing result in the creation of
deposits which are placed directly at the disposal of the government.
Following the last war the policy of borrow-and-buy came into thorough-
going disrepute. Rightly or wrongly, it was given a considerable share of
responsibility for the rise in prices that occurred at that time. So completely
was it discredited that no great effort has been made to revive it in the
present emergency. The principal objection advanced against borrow-and-
buy was that it involved an increase in circulating medium in the form of
bank deposits.25 The validity of this objection may be challenged at the
present time when the alternative, borrowing directly from banks,is
similarly expansionist in character.
A given amount of borrowing from banks will presumably result in the
same increase in bank credit under either method of financing; the infla-
tionary tendency at the time of borrowing may therefore be assumed to be
the same. With borrow-and-buy, however, the participation of the public
would be broadened and the net obligation on securities so acquired would
tend ultimately to be transferred from the banks to the public. This would
operate to contract the volume of deposits as loans secured in this way were
paid off. In effect, the policy of borrow-and-buy would permit individuals
to pay for bonds out of income on an instalment basis.
It has been suggested that the opportunity to borrow in order to buy might
reduce the incentive to save in order to buy; but during the last war it
was maintained that the effect of borrowing to buy was to make people
work harder and save more, because savings were pledged and invested before
they were accumulated. In fact, it was said that the public tended to over-
estimate the amount they could save and thereafter were under strong
pressure to fulfill the commitments they had made in a rush of patriotic
enthusiasm.
Thus, there are inflationary dangers associated with both a borrow-and-buy
program and the policy of direct borrowing from banks. Likewise the meth-
ods employed to hold inflation within bounds—taxation, borrowing out of
income, rationing, price controls—would presumably be equally effective, or
ineffective, against credit inflation originating in borrow-and-buy.
24 In addition to credit extended in this way, a considerably larger total was advanced to in-
dustry directly from 1917 to 1919 than was provided by loans on the collateral of government
bonds.
25 Further aspects of the problem, which bear particularly on bank operations, will be treated
in a later study in this series.
30Treasury Borrowing from Federal Reserve Banks
At various times in recent months the proposal has been advanced to allow
the Treasury to borrow directly from the Federal Reserve Banks. In support
of this suggestion it was argued that necessary financial operations could
be carried through at smaller cost and with less disturbance to the market.
In opposition, the proposal was condemned as virtually on. a par with the
issue of paper currency, with extreme inflation as its inevitable consequence.
When the issue came before Congress the Federal Reserve Banks were
given authority under certain conditions to lend directly to the Treasury
up to a total of $5 billion.
It needs to be be observed that this method of financing, like that now
followed, would lead to a growth of commercial bank deposits as the
Treasury disbursed the credits established with the Federal Reserve Banks.
It would have the additional effect, however, of increasing member bank
reserves. The same result of loading the Reserve Banks with government
securities, which opponents of the proposal feared, could be brought about
by Federal Reserve purchases in the open market. To suppose that this would
be practicable in the one situation and not in the other requires the arbitrary
assumption that the Reserve authorities would be subservient to the Treas-
ury if purchases were direct, and independent if they had to be made in the
open market.
Direct borrowing from the Reserve Banks would resemble the issue of
paper money in that both the reserves and the deposits of member banks
would be increased, leading to a marked expansion in excess reserves. It
would be more inflationary than borrowing from commercial banks since
the latter method, although it increases deposits, also reduces excess reserves.26
A further objection advanced by opponents of the proposal was; that
direct sale prevents a market testing of particular issues. The advocates of
the proposal, however, question whether any effective testing of government
credit is possible under wartime controls:.
It may be remarked in summary that methods of monetary expansion
cannot be evaluated solely in terms of the volume of circulating medium, the
reserve position of banks, or other quantitative factors. To a great many
people, the possibility that a departure from familiar methods of financing
might destroy public confidence or lead to political abuse appears more
menacing than any purely quantitative consideration. Nor is this judgment
20Aswas pointed out earlier, reserves can hardly be considered a serious check on deposit expan-
sion under wartime conditions. See the annual report of the Bank for International Settlements
for 1941-42, pp. 13-14. On the basis chiefly of European experience, this report classifies borrow-
ing from the central bank as the most inflationary method of war finance.
3'appreciably altered by a recognition that existing methods may themselves
be highly expansionist. The importance customarily attached to subjective
interpretations helps to explain why the quantitative factors mentioned above
have generally been given so little emphasis.
MONETARY EXPANSION AND THE PROBLEM OF INFLATION21
A sudden and pronounced increase in the volume of circulating medium
always gives rise to the fear of inflation. It has become customary to discuss
the problem of inflation in the present war, however, not in terms of the
quantity of money but of incomes and expenditures, or more especially,
of consumer incomes in relation to the supply of consumer goods and
services. The explanation, briefly,is that enlarged expenditures by the
government lead to an expansion of incomes but, because they are directed
toward the production of war materials, do not lead to a corresponding
increase in the supply of goods and services available for purchases by the
public. The result is the emergence of a so-called inflationary gap, an excess
of potential demand over potential supply. The former is represented by
consumer income and the latter by consumer goods and services available
at the prevailing level of prices.
Tile Bases of inflation
The question here is how the growth of circulating medium is related to
this familiar explanation of the causes of inflation. The relationship would
seem to rest principally on two considerations. In the iirst place, when
funds disbursed by the government are obtained by borrowing newly
created deposits from banks, there is no offsetting reduction in total means
payment at the disposalthe public. Consequendy expenditures by the
public are presumably larger than they would be if the governmeiit had
acquired the sums it spends by taxation or borrowing out of income. in the
second place, the increase in total circulating medium maintains the stream
of income and expenditure in an inflated condition through subsequent
exchanges. Thus the expansionist effect persists: the continued growth of
circulating medium contributes to a sustained rise in income.
It is often implied that taxation or borrowing from the public will reduce
27 Note by Clarence Heer, Director: For the benefit of. those readers who are not acquainted
with the plan of this series, it should be emphasized that this paper is primarily a study of war-
time changes in the volume of currency and deposits and their relation to the problem of infla-
tion. This restriction in scope is partly because of limitations of space and partly because plans
call for the treatment elsewhere of other aspects of the problem of war finance. Any appearance
of over-emphasis or omission that may result from this arbitrary division of subject matter will,
it is be remedied through the publication of other papers in the series.
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